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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order for the testimony of Defendant's step-sons 
Eric and Erron Speer to be admitted as impeachment by 
contradiction evidence, it must be established that the Defendant 
offered evidence of his character as an essential element of a 
defense. Testimony cited by Respondent in its reply brief 
placing the Defendant's character at issue is more correctly 
qualified as background information, the sequence of events as 
they transpired on the day in question, and the Defendant's 
opinion about why his sons distrusted him. At no time was the 
Defendant's character made an issue of a defense, or an essential 
element of the crimes charged. As a result, the testimony of 
Eric and Erron Speer constituted an impermissible attack upon the 
Defendant's character and should have been excluded. 
The failure of the Trial Court to enter an order 
reassigning the matter to Judge Fredericks denied Defendant his 
right to adequate notice and opportunity to be heard regarding 
the bias and prejudice of the newly assigned Judge. As a direct 
result, the Defendant's Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice was 
untimely and then subsequently withdrawn based upon Defendant's 
understanding that the Affidavit was tardy. The right to 
challenge the bias and prejudice of a Judge is considered 
substantial enough to merit a ruling of prejudicial error. 
The evidentiary record fails to clearly establish the 
Defendant's intent in carrying a firearm during the incident in 
question. Rather, the record unequivocally states that at no 
time did the Defendant threaten his wife with the gun or use it 
in his confrontations with her. Consequently, a reasonable basis 
exists for aquitting the Defendant of the aggravated charges and 
convicting him of the simple charges of assault and burglary. 
Defense counsel's failure to request a lesser included 
offense instruction for burglary and assault, as well as his 
failure to notify and to consult with the Defendant regarding the 
stipulated continuance on a collateral criminal charges caused 
the Defendant to suffer the admission of highly prejudicial 
testimony without adequate opportunity to prepare a defense. The 
likelihood of a different result constituted sufficient 
prejudicial error to merit reversal and remanding herein. 
Finally, while Defendant concedes that the Prosecutor 
correctly stated the law with regard to the elements for 
aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, Defendant reasserts 
the impropriety and prejudicial effect of the cross-examination 
questions on collateral matters unrelated and immaterial to the 
immediate alleged criminal act. Likewise, Defendant cites the 
improper argument of the Prosecutor with regard to prior bad acts 
of the Defendant. Each one of the foregoing errors, together and 
separately, constitute sufficiently prejudicial error to merit 
reversal and remanding of this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TESTIMONY OF ERIC AND ERRON SPEER WAS 
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AS CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Under the general rulef evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion. Utah Rule of Evidence 40 4(a) (19 86 Supp.) 
However, a defendant may offer evidence of a pertinent trait of 
his character, or prosecution may offer evidence to rebutt the 
same. Utah Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1). Furthermore, evidence of 
other crimes or wrongs may be admitted for other purposes such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. Utah Rule 
of Evidence 40 4(b). Specific instances of prior conduct are 
thus admissible in cases in which character or a trait of 
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim 
or defense. Admissibility hinges on questions of "issues in 
controversy"; character evidence is only admissible when 
character is at issue, either as an element of the charge, as a 
defense, or as a rebuttal to such a defense. 
To become an element of a defense, the issue of 
character must be raised by the defendant in his case. In the 
immediate proceeding, Respondent avers that the Defendant placed 
his character in issue by attempting to paint himself as a loving 
husband and father who would never hurt his wife and children, 
(Brief of Respondent at 15.) Based upon this assertion, 
Respondent continues to structure its argument for admissibility 
of the testimony of Eric and Erron Speer as rebuttal testimony to 
the character evidence proffered by the accused on direct and 
cross examination testimony. Specifically, Respondent cites the 
following excerpts from the Defendant's testimony: Direct 
examination - that Defendant's wife turned their two sons against 
him (Record at 509), Defendant was allowed in victim's home on a 
number of occasions after being granted permission (Record at 
507, 511), Defendant restrained victim from hitting and 
scratching him (Record at 513), Defendant had no intentions of 
harming victim, rather his intention was to kill himself, and he 
restrained Mrs, Speer a second time from leaving the house 
(Record at 514); on cross examination - Defendant loved the 
victim, would not hurt her, and had not abused her over the 
proceeding ten years (Record at 516, 537, 538), Defendant did not 
tie the victim's wrists and did not remember how they both ended 
up on the floor (Record at 541), he had not threatened or harmed 
the boys in the past, and he loved them (Record at 549). 
The major flaw in Respondent's argument is that the 
testimony cited above was not offered to prove an element of the 
Defendant's character as a defense to the charges, nor was it 
offered to prove an element of the charges of burglary, 
aggravated burglary, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, assault, 
or aggravated assault. Rather, the Defendant's testimony on 
direct was admitted for the purpose of determining his opinion 
of why his sons mistrusted him and the testimony elicited from 
the Defendant on cross examination which admitted under Utah Rule 
of Evidence 608 (b) to attack his credibility. Furthermore, the 
proffering of the two boys1 testimony on rebuttal was not 
directed toward establishing the Plaintifffs intent, but was 
offered specifically as evidence of the Defendant's character and 
his criminal propensities. 
As stated more fully in Appellant's Original Brief, the 
subject testimony of the two boys was inadmissible under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 608(b), an express limitation on extrinsic 
evidence attacking or supporting a witness1 credibility. The 
standard as applied in this state is commonly known as the 
"linchpin test". State v.- Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977). 
Respondent has conceded that such testimony is arguably 
inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 608(b). Brief of 
Respondent at 10-11. However, the State offers the alternative 
argument of admissibility of the testimony under Utah Rules of 
Evidence 40 4 and 40 5, claiming the Defendant's character was at 
issue. 
It is firmly and universally established in policy and 
tradition that the prosecution may not initiate an attack on the 
Defendant's character. Wigmore" on" Evidence, Section 57 (1983 
Ed.) Only after a Defendant has attempted to show his good 
character in his own aidf can prosecution offer rebuttal evidence 
of bad character. Id. at Section 57. The question becomes then, 
did the Defendant place his character at issue in the trial 
proceedings? Where a Defendant calls a character witnessf who 
testifies as to specific character traits that would support a 
defense, rebuttal evidence as to bad character or to impeachment 
of the good character evidence is clearly admissible. Where the 
Defendant testifies himself as to his personal background and 
history and the testimony tends to show that the Defendant is the 
sort of exemplary person who is not likely to commit the crimes 
charged, the courts tend to rule on the question of admissibility 
differently. A witness who testifies to such identifying 
biographical data as place of birth, education, address, marital 
status, length of residence in the community and employment 
history has been held to not constitute placement of character at 
issue. State-• v. Bright, 543 P.2d 928 (Kan. 1975). Where the 
Defendant's testimony goes beyond the background parameters and 
attempts to characterize the Defendant or the Defendant's past 
life as blemish free, or makes reference to specific prior 
incidents, the Defendant then foregoes the protections of the rule 
of character evidence, id. at 930. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the following 
interchange between defense counsel and the witness constituted 
character evidence: 
"Q. Well, state what his disposition is as 
far as being - well whatever you think of, I 
don't want to lead you, of course." 
MA. George is a nice fellow, he is an easy-
going fellow. He loves to drink and be 
around people, violent- George is not the 
violent type." 
Based upon this interchange, the appellate Court affirmed the 
admission of cross examination testimony regarding a prior 
conviction of the Defendant for armed robbery. The direct 
testimony in the immediate case is distinguishable from the 
Byigfrt case. On direct, the testimony of the Defendant 
regarding the status of his marriage, the length of the marriage, 
his employment history, and his terms of residence in the 
community were merely background information to introduce him as 
a witness to the jury. Neither the testimony regarding 
Mrs. Speer's turning the two boys against the Defendant nor the 
testimony as to the sequence of events on the day of the incident 
charged tended to establish any character trait of the Defendant. 
In no way did any of the direct testimony attempt to characterize 
Defendant or go beyond the limitations as outlined by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in State v. Bright. Rather, this testimony at 
most went toward the Defendant's opinion about why his sons 
distrusted him and the actual physical sequence of events as 
they transpired. 
With regard to the testimony elicited on cross 
examination, it is generally held that the Defendant as a witness 
is indeed subject to the issues of credibility and can be 
challenged on cross examination. However, a general denial by a 
Defendant-witness that he did a particular act is not sufficient 
to place the Defendant's character at issue. State v. -Sharich, 
209 NW.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1973). In the Sharich case, the 
Minnesota Court held that the Defendant witness1 denial of being 
a prostitute did not put her character at issue. The State was 
barred from proffering testimony to rebutt the Defendant's 
response or from asserting that such evidence merely went to the 
Defendant's credibility. See also State v. Frentz 354 SO.2d 1007 
(La. 1978) (direct denial on cross examination does not put 
character at issue). 
The common rational for this exclusionary rule can be 
reduced to three positions: (1) the overstrong tendency to 
believe the accused guilty of the charge merely because he is a 
likely person to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn not 
because the accused is believed guilty of the present charge but 
because he has escaped unpunished from other offenses; (3) the 
injustice of attacking one necessarily unprepared to demonstrate 
that the attacking evidence is fabricated (unfair surprise). 
Wigmore- - on* Evidence, Section 58,2. See also Appellantfs 
Original Brief, Point I. 
While the Respondent argues that the Defendant's 
testimony on direct and cross examination placed his character in 
issue by attempting to create the image of a loving husband and 
father, the Record on Appeal fails to substantiate this position. 
Rather, Defendant's testimony beyond the background and 
introductory statements were merely probative of the actual 
physical sequence of events as they transpired and the 
Defendant's opinion about why his sons mistrusted him. The 
character evidence submitted by the Plaintiff through the 
testimony of Eric and Erron Speer thus constituted an initial 
attack upon the Defendant's character rather than the rebutting 
of character as an issue. Under the terms of Utah Rules of 
Evidence 404(a)(1) the testimony of Eric and Erron Speer is 
inadmissible for failure to qualify as rebuttal as to proffered 
character evidence. Furthermore, the testimony of the two boys 
fails to qualify for the purposes of establishing proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity or absence of mistake or accident. 
POINT II 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO ENTER AN ORDER REASSIGNING 
THE JUDGE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
The Record on Appeal shows no entry of an Order by the 
Court reassigning the matter to Judge Fredericks, as required by 
Rule of Practice in the District Courts 3.4. Rather, the 
Records shows a minute entry by the Honorable Timothy R. Hansen 
dated April 17, 1985 (Record on Appeal at 33) , and a Record of 
Proceedings for the trial conducted one week later on April 23 
and 24, 1985. (Record on Appeal at 36-41.) The Record also 
shows that the first objection to the hearing of the matter by 
Judge Fredericks came in an Affidavit of Prejudice filed by the 
Defendant as counsel pro se on June 15, 1985. (Record on Appeal 
at 198.) Such Affidavit was subsequently withdrawn on June 1, 
1985 by the Defendant with the concurrence with his temporary 
counsel Nancy Bergeson of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association. (Record on Appeal at 212.) Ms. Bergeson's 
subsequent withdrawal on September 30, 1985 and present counselfs 
Entry of Appearance on October 4, 1985 was followed by the 
raising of this issue for the second time in the Defendants 
present appeal. 
Admittedly, the Defendants Affidavit of Bias was filed 
after the conclusion of the trial, and was subsequently 
withdrawn. However, the exigent circumstances surrounding the 
Defendants legal representation and the reassignment of the case 
at the "midnight hour" without benefit of a Court Order justify 
the Utah Supreme Court's consideration of this matter on appeal* 
By virtue of the Trial Courtfs failure to enter an 
order reassigning the case from Judge Hansen1 s court to Judge 
Fredericks1 Court/ the Defendant was without adequate notice that 
such a change was to take placef and that he would have an 
opportunity to file an Affidavit of Prejudice against the newly 
assigned Judge. Rather, the Defendant's first notice of 
reassignment came at the trial itself. Without proper notice, 
Defendant had no opportunity to review the matter and even 
consider filing an Affidavit of Prejudice. As the case unfolded, 
the Defendant's trial counsel withdrew immediately after 
sentencing, and Defendant was left to his own devices to contest 
the error. Accordingly, Defendant filed his Affidavit of 
Prejudice as counsel pro se. As a Defendant representing 
himself, and without adequate knowledge of the laws of Utah, the 
timeliness of Defendant's Affidavit is reasonable. In light of 
these exceptional circumstances, it is proper for this Court to 
consider the issue in its present posture. Section 77-35-12(d), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), State v.- Steqqell, 660 P.2d 
252, 254 (Utah 1983). 
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides in part that any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not effect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded. Section 77-35-30(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended). This Court has interpreted the Rule to require the 
reversal of a conviction only when the error "is something 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different 
result." State \r. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982) 
cited in State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1983) 
(citations omitted). In the immediate case, the failure of the 
court to provide Defendant with adequate notice of the 
reassignment of judge constituted prejudicial error; with proper 
notice, Defendant would have had a reasonable opportunity to 
prepare and file his Affidavit of Prejudice with the assistance 
of legal counsel and the question of Judge Frederick's bias or 
prejudice could have been resolved in a timely fashion. While 
the Affidavit in its rough form may not upon its face establish 
a reasonable likelihood that Judge Fredericks would have been 
found to be biased or prejudiced against the Defendant, the fact 
that Defendant prepared the document without benefit of legal 
counsel, and subsequently withdrew it upon the advice that its 
tardiness made it an improper motion before the Court effectively 
denied Defendant his due process guarantees of a fair and 
unbiased tribunal. See Riley v. State, 608 P.2d 27 (Alaska 
1980). In Riley, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the 
underlying court abused its discretion in failing to waive the 
strict time limits imposed upon a criminal defendant in 
requesting a change of Judge. The Court based its conclusion 
upon the clear fact that petitioners did not have an opportunity 
to consult counsel before the time to exercise such right had 
expired, and could not have intelligently made such decision 
19 
without counsel. The right to peremptorily challenge a judge was 
held sufficiently important that it should not be lost by 
inaction before there is an opportunity to confer with an 
attorney, 608 P.2d at 29. See also Adams v. State, 376 NE.2d 
482 (Ind. 1978) (pro se defendant's Motion for Change of Judge 
erroneously denied where a judgefs identity first learned of 
after expiration of time period.) 
The Trial Courtfs failure to comply with Rule of 
Practice 3.4 thus denied the Defendant his recognized right to 
challenge the bias or prejudice of the judge, and the denial of 
such right is sufficient to merit a ruling of prejudicial error 
herein. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS DEFENDANT'S ACQUITTAL ON AGGRAVATED 
CHARGES AND CONVICTION ON SIMPLE CHARGES 
The basis of the Statefs assertion that Defendant 
should be convicted on aggravated charges of burglary and assault 
rests upon the Defendant's "brandishing" of a firearm during the 
incident. (Brief of Respondent at 25.) Yet, the record does not 
clearly establish the presence of the firearm was in any manner 
intended to threaten the victim. Rather, the Record on Appeal 
merely establishes the presence of the firearm, and the ambiguity 
of its purpose. 
Sharon Speer testified that the Defendant was carrying 
a shotgun when he first entered her bedroom (Record at 408), and 
that he laid it on the floor (Record at 417) . After an ensuing 
struggle, Defendant helped Ms. Speer up from the floor, took the 
shotgun and walked with her back downstairs (Record at 418). The 
parties engaged in a second struggle in which the Defendant used 
both of his hands in squeezing Ms. Speerfs throat (Record at 420-
22). In order to use both hands, he would have had to lay down 
the rifle. Defendant then took a cabinet in an adjacent room, 
the original shotgun and went with his wife back up to the 
bedroom (Record at 423). At that time, Defendant held on to both 
of the guns with one hand and made Mrs. Speer walk ahead of him 
up the stairs (Record at 423-24). The parties again went 
downstairs to the kitchen and back up to the bedroom (Record at 
42 4) after having laid the second gun on the bedroom floor where 
it remained (Record at 425). Although Defendant told Ms. Speer 
that the gun was loaded (Record at 425) , when they returned to 
the kitchen one more time, Defendant placed the gun on the floor 
beside him (Record at 431). After the Defendant fixed both of 
them some coffee, he took the shotgun and the coffee and they 
again returned to the bedroom (Record at 428) . As they drank 
their coffee, the Defendant placed the gun on the floor beside 
him (Record at 431). Upon hearing the doorbell ring, the 
Defendant and Mrs. Speer went downstairs to the kitchen, leaving 
the rifle upstairs in the bedroom (Record at 435), where it was 
later found by the arresting officer (Record at 475). 
Mi 
During this entire time, the Defendant never pointed 
the gun either at Ms. Speer or himself (Record at 450). Norf did 
he ever say he was going to kill the Defendant (Record at 450) . 
Yet he did tell the Defendant that "life wasn't worth living; I 
had hurt him so badlyf did so many wrong things to him and he 
just didn't want to live.11 (Record at 449.) Mrs. Speer 
interpreted this to mean that the Defendant was going to kill 
himself. Id. Each of the times that the Defendant struggled 
with his wife, the gun was not used nor pointed at Mrs. Speer in 
a threatening manner. Rather, the Defendant pushed her (Record 
at 414), and used his hands in squeezing her throat (Record at 
421). 
Clearly, the use of the firearm in the assault is 
placed in question. When evidence is ambiguous and therefore 
susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one alternative 
would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of 
the lesser, a jury questions exists and the court must give a 
lesser included offense instruction at the request of the 
Defendant. -State- v. Baker, 671 P. 2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983). This 
situation has arisen where the critical question is the 
determination of what inferences may legitimately be made on the 
basis of the evidence. 
By assessing the evidence and deciding whether 
any interpretation of it would, if believed by the 
jury, permit conviction of the lesser offense and 
acquittal of the greater, the Court "preserves the 
reviewing of evidence for the jury but is still able 
to protect the weighing process from frivolous 'red 
hearings1", id. 
As in the case of State-v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 
1984) looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Defendant there was evidence presented that showed Defendant did 
not threaten Mrs. Speer with the gun, either verbally or 
physically, nor did he use it in any of his struggles with her. 
Rather, in each instance where the parties were confrontive, 
Mr. Speer laid the gun aside and used his bare hands. The record 
does not show any evidence that the Defendant ever placed his 
hands upon the gun's trigger, nor make any other motions in an 
attempt to use the gun. Contrary to the respondent's assertion, 
the Defendant did not "brandish the gun while assaulting 
Mrs. Speer" (Respondent's Brief at 26). Likewise, the Defendant 
did not use the gun in gaining entry into Mrs. Speer's home. The 
evidentiary record fails to establish that Defendant used a 
deadly weapon in the alleged assault, or threatened the immediate 
use of the same as required under Section 76-5-103(b) or Section 
76-6-203(b)-(c), Utah Code Ann. (1978). Consequently, a 
reasonable basis in the evidentiary record exists for acquitting 
the Defendant of the aggravated charges and convicting him of the 
simple charges of assault and burglary. 
Respondent claims that because the Defendant failed to 
offer such lesser included offense in its jury instructions that 
he is precluded from raising the issue on appeal. However, as 
stated in the Appellant's initial appeal brief at 17, and Section 
77-35-19(c), Utah Code Ann, (1953), notwithstanding a party's 
failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order 
to avoid manifest injustice. The failure of defense counsel to 
raise an objection to the omission of such jury instruction is 
assigned as error by Appellant (Appellant's Brief at 11-12), and 
Appellant's substantive and procedural rights should not suffer 
because of his counsel's error. To hold otherwise would 
constitute a manifest injustice. 
POINT IV 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ERRORS WERE PREJUDICIAL 
As detailed more fully in Point III of this Reply 
Brief, Defendant suffered prejudicial error as a result of the 
lack of a lesser include offense instruction for simple assault 
and burglary. As stated therein, the Record on Appeal 
establishes sufficient evidence to acquit Defendant on the 
charges of aggravated assault and burglary and to convict him of 
the charges of simple assault and burglary, under the standards 
of review set forth by this Court under State v.- Baker, 671 p.2d 
at 159. 
Likewise, Defendant suffered prejudicial error as a 
result of his counsel's unauthorized stipulation to a continuance 
of a second criminal case against the Defendant, The Record on 
Appeal establishes that the evidence regarding a prior bad act 
1 7 
became the focus of a heated debate between trial counsel and the 
prosecutor (Record on Appeal at 523-53 4), At the conclusion of 
the debate, the trial court allowed the admission of evidence 
regarding a prior incident in December, 1984, the subject of the 
collateral criminal charge. The basis for the Court's ruling 
was that the testimony was relevant as to whether or not the 
Defendant logically thought he was welcome in Mrs. Speer's home 
(Record on Appeal at 529). (Record on Appeal at 530-53 4). Mr. 
Speer was then subjected to a rigorous cross-examination by the 
prosecution concerning a completely separate incident. The 
Defendant was without prior notice of such attack and was not 
prepared to defend himself, nor was he allowed to consult with 
his attorney in order to prepare an adequate response to such 
impeachment testimony. This error combined with defense 
counselfs failure to prepare evidence and offer the testimony of 
credibility witnesses to bolster the Defendant's testimony in 
response to the rigorous cross-examination denied Defendant his 
right to effective assistance of counsel and materially 
prejudiced his defense. 
Had the second criminal matter against the Defendant 
been argued as originally scheduled, Defendant would have had the 
opportunity to prepare and present a full defense to the 
collateral criminal charges. He would have had the opportunity 
to consult with counsel regarding his testimony per the alleged 
offense. He would have had adequate opportunity to depose 
witnesses such as Jeanie Hessling f Eric Speer, Sharon Speer and 
, ( . \-n- f - a,;:,, f lie 
matter developed, tu Defendan .. ;. .^ntu: cross-
examinatior • r prosecutor with questions concerning a prior 
bad act deemed admissi. .-
 j • . or;«
:>u <>f' 
establishing whether or not Defendant was welcome in his wife's 
home. 
The Trial Court in its discretion -.
 ; owoc; ~;;c admission 
o" th-*'-- e v i d e n c e , c ••»-r t be strenuous- o'r •'cctjor:.- of def e n s e 
- - « ; . ' • * • I: : : tl le 
continuance. • : : -- second criminal m a t t o : aaaii L-t r;ofendant 
witnuut Defendant ^ --nowledao ^ "onsent that placed defense 
counsel ::: t^ 0 r^e — _ ,
 ;t -. •;;, c - . n : . d, Had 
the matter i lot been continued by stipulate defendant would 
I, iv* Kv! arirquili ii"1 > i opportunity to rebutt the charges 
and the incident would have been held a crime or dismissed as not 
criminal. Subsequent inquirv and admissibility in ihe immediate 
Questions going behind t he pii^t convi. i i i *. • o- , , c c . would 
have then been properly limited and the prejudicial evidence 
restricted. But • ma 11 e r wa s i i iq i 1 i i: e c:l :i i 11 c :i i 1 t 1 1 € • i mmed i a t e 
case, and Defendant was not provided /-is uraranteed rights to 
• J r.--..i .:• nefense. Section 
7 7 - 1 6 - c u a t *.;. w * I - • : - ' . - o c 11 o n 1 2 , II t a h 
Constitution. Defendant thus suffered the admission of 
inadequately contested allegations of prior bad acts and the 
prejudicial effect of such evidence upon his character - the 
picture created was of a violent man prone to commit the charges 
alleged, and the jury was accordingly influenced. Without such 
evidence, a different verdict would likely have resulted in 
either guilty of the simple charges or acquitted. 
While defense counsel is allowed a certain amount of 
discretion in his "legitimate exercise of judgment as to trial 
tactics or strategy", State" v. McNicole, 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 
1976), such discretion does not empower the attorney to "impair 
the client's substantial rights". Blanton~ v. Womencare, Inc> 
696 P.2d 645, 6 50 (Cal. 1985). Defense, counsel's actions 
herein breached the parameters of permissible, individual 
discretions, fell below the objective standards of reasonably 
competent, professional assistance, State v% Frame, 723 P.2d 410 
(Utah 1986), and substantially prejudiced appellant's defense. 
Such ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily constitutes 
reversible error. State v. McNicole, 554 P.2D 203, 204 (Utah 
1976). 
POINT" V 
THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARACTER QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT CONSTITUTED 
IMPROPER CONDUCT 
As stated more fully in Point I, the admissibility of 
character evidence of a Defendant is limited to elements of a 
charged offense, offers by the Defendant;, r rebuttal to the 
,, ..t . vi.if -e 40 4(a) (1) (19 S3 
amended). Yet t nc P r o s e c u U u ; . a i s e d : ^ a number oJ 
ins tances object ionable evidence whici r ^i • * raJ ! wi th in t h e s e 
pa ramet L :. * • ' • * - a r r n n q cm e n t 
with anothf, women ^Transcrijt au 42- '- ; * alleged abuse of 
r
 * ,
 r
": i o r a 1 ] e g e d 
criminal acLs (Transciji, jt .* - , ... 
third p a r t i e s (Transciiyt at r-:o---«4 , M; Impropriety o£ 
. i-- • ' r: .-' * "%r r f * and a 
c« I Jateral criminal act charged against the Defendan* erf* 
discussed z-.^r^ f ni>- -<0j nts r, r<-r >y o; this Repl^ Rrief. 
Point ^rthermore elaborate 
evidence. That argument applies equally to t< ,-•? cross-examination 
q *• • • ""rcutioi i concern r-<-: d e f e n d a n t ' s present 
domestic living arrangement and an a.i ;oy*. ;. ; : i <: i: conver sat li c »i i 
with h, thiro party unrelated to - )> immediate alleged criminal 
a i • I , L ..;.;.. ' , prorreriit a t t e m p t e d uu raise col l a t e r a l 
issues on cross-examination before the jury *-o efitot a specific 
imaq° 4 ^for^ai' as PI <•?•••- * ' i M e r c ^ and threats', ..nd 
c a l - v * • •> ' • * >- 1 
sufficient prejudicial error for reversal by this Court, See 
State v, Hodges, 5] 7 P.2d 1322 (Utah 197 4); State v. Dickson, 12 
01 
Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412; State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266f 383 P.2d 
407, cited in Appellantfs Brief at page 18. 
Appellant concedes that the closing argument of the 
prosecutor contained a correct statement of law regarding the 
elements for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. 
However, Appellant does cite as improper argument the 
prosecutor's discussion of the prior bad acts of the Defendant 
(Record on Appeal at 310-311). Over defense counsel's 
objections, Mr, Horton specifically argued that these prior bad 
acts establish a character which conforms to the charged 
offenses. Where such issues are inadmissible as evidence (See 
Points I and IV above) they are likewise inadmissible in argument 
by counsel and constitute reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant requests that this 
Court reverse the Trial Courtfs conviction of Defendant, and 
remand for appropriate proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3/*rday of December, 1986. 
JEROME H. MOONEY /J1 
R. KYLE TREADWAY u 
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ADDENDUM 
DBSPEEP (4) 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in. which the ofTense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same ofTense. 
RULE OF PRACTICE DISTRICT COURT 
RULE 3.4. CONTINUANCE OF CRIMINAL CASES AND CRIMINAL MOTIONS 
(a) All motions for continuance of trial or hearing shall 
be made orally in open court or in writing, and shall state the 
reasons therefore together with proof that notice of the motion 
has been duly served upon the adverse party. Notice of all 
continuances must be given to the defendant. Notice of a 
continuance may be given in personf by telephone or by inal 1 The 
manner i 11 which notice was effected shall be set. forth i i 1 the 
file. 
(b) Criminal cases that have been set for trial or hearing 
shall not be continued or reassigned except, upon order of the 
Court. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault.— (1) A person commits aggravated as-
sault if he commits assault as defined in section 76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another,* or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a irluh) of the third degree. 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary, the 
actor or another participant in the crime i 
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in 
the crime; or 
(b) Uses or threatens the imnjediate use of a daugerous or deadly 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) Is armed with a deadly weapon or possesses or attempts to use 
any explosive or deadly weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a felony of the first degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-203, enacted by 
L. 197S, ch. 196, § 76-6-203. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. (1) In criminal prosecutions the defend-
ant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a CODV of the accusation filed against him: 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses 
:n his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor 
a husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial 
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by 
a magistrate. 
77-35-12. Rule 12 — Motions. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or 
to make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set 
by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown 
may grant relief from such waiver. 
77-35-19. Rule 19 - Instructions. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
77-35-30. Rule 30 — Errors and defects, (a) Any error, defect, irregu-
larity or variance uhich does not affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be cor-
rected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court 
may order. 
UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 404 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEP-
TIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
his character is not admissible fur the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of 
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evi-
dence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in 
a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 60S, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident. 
RULE 405 
METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of 
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation 
or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquin- is allowable 
into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of char-
acter of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also 
be made of specific instances of his conduct. 
RULE 608 
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, 
for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or un-
truthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not 
operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with 
respect to matters which relate only to credibility. 
